The ultimate measure of a constitution is how it balances en trenchment and change. On the one hand, a constitution differs from all other laws in that it is much more difficult to revise. For example, the next session of Congress can amend or repeal a stat ute, but altering the U.S. Constitution requires a complex process involving supermajorities of both houses of Congress and the states. A constitution thus reflects a desire to place a society's core values of governance -such as the structure of government and the rights of individuals -in a document that is hard to revise. By enacting a constitution, society limits itself in an effort to protect the values it most cherishes. For a constitution to achieve this goal it must endure.
But in order for a constitution to endure, it must contain mecha nisms for adaptation to changing circumstances. Changes in social organization, in technology, and in morality all require that the con stitution evolve. The agrarian slave society of 1787 is so vastly dif ferent from the world of the coming twenty-first century that it is unthinkable that the understandings of 200 years ago could solely govern modem society. Those drafting a constitution cannot possi bly imagine the myriad of issues that will arise decades and centu ries later.
A constitution thus must mediate the competing desires for en trenchment and flexibility, for stability and change. Sometimes constitutions emphasize the former and make revisions impossible or very difficult. Long ago, in ancient Greece, Ly curgus, the ruler of Sparta, insisted that his laws not be changed until he returned from a long joumey.1 Ly curgus then killed himself to ensure that the laws not be altered, and they survived for 500 years. sion. The constitutions of Germany and Brazil expressly state that the division of power between the national and local governments is not subject to amendment. 3 Morocco's constitution states that it may not be amended to eliminate the monarchy or Islam as the official religion.4
Nations that have experienced foreign occupation often have provisions limiting amendment in the case of future foreign inva sions. For example, the constitution of the French Fo urth Republic, adopted in 1946 in the wake of liberation from Nazi control, prohib ited amendment of the constitution "in case of occupation of all or part of the metropolitan territory by foreign force."5
In fact, even the U.S. Constitution specifies certain matters that may not be changed, even by amendment. Article V, which details the amendment process, states that "no Amendment which may be made prior to the Ye ar One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Sec tion of the first Article; and ... no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. " 6 The two clauses in Article I that could not be changed prohibited Congress from banning the importing of slaves and prevented a direct tax unless it was apportioned based on the census.
On the other hand, some constitutions provide very little in the way of entrenchment or resistance to change. State constitutions generally are much easier to amend than the U.S. Constitution and have been amended much more frequently.7 The doctrine of Par liament's sovereignty in Great Britain means that legislative acts trump the constitution. As Professor David E. Ky vig 8 observes: "As the concept of parliamentary supremacy emerged from notions that sovereignty belonged to the people rather than to the monarch and that Parliament legitimately represented the sovereign will, any thought of limiting Parliament's power to alter the terms of govern ment faded away" (p. 20).
The key challenge for a constitution is to strike the optimal bal ance between entrenchment and flexibility. change too difficult, it will obstruct necessary and desirable social reforms. Revolution will become the only way of altering the gov ernment. But if change is too easy, then a constitution fails to achieve its obj ective of protecting society's most cherished values from majoritarian control. The amendment process is thus not peripheral to the constitu tion, but is its essence. Professor Ky vig's new book, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995, pro vides an excellent history of the amendment process, from the rati fication of the Constitution until 1995. Professor Kyvig shows that from its inception, the amendment process was integral to the very existence of the Constitution. For example, at the state ratifying conventions, supporters of the Constitution could answer objections by pointing to Article V and the ability to change imperfections (pp. 81, 85). Unlike the Articles of Confederation, which required unanimous consent of the states for amendments, the Constitution offered a more realistic process for change. Thus, state calls for a bill of rights could be met, not by defeating ratification until a new constitutional convention was held, but by the amendment process (pp. 81-85). As Professor Ky vig notes, "At several crucial junctures in the struggle over ratification, most notably in the Massachusetts, Virginia, and New Yo rk conventions, the promise of amendment swung the balance in favor of acceptance" (p. 85).
Professor Ky vig's book describes in detail the attempts, success ful and unsuccessful, to amend the Constitution since 1787. The book provides a wealth of fascinating facts. For example, I had not known that James Madison, the crucial figure in drafting the Bill of Rights, almost was not elected to the first Congress. Patrick Henry, Madison's foe, successfully kept the Virginia legislature from choos ing Madison for the United States Senate and Madison's home county was gerrymandered into a largely anti-Federalist district (p. 95). Madison defeated his opponent, James Monroe, for the House seat only after promising his commitment to adding a bill of rights to the Constitution.
Even more important, I did not know that in 1861, on the eve of the Civil War, both houses of Congress ratified an amendment to protect the institution of slavery. The amendment, introduced by Thomas Corwin and supported by President Lincoln, provided: "No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will au thorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State" (p. 151). well Article V strikes a balance between entrenchment and flexibil ity. Over the course of American history, more than 10,000 amend ments have been proposed through the mechanisms provided in Article V of the Constitution. Only thirty-three received approval by both the House and the Senate, and just twenty-seven have been ratified by the states. Ye t, most of the ratified amendments, by any measure, were desirable revisions to the Constitution. The Bill of Rights was crucial to the ratification of the document and has been key in protecting basic liberties. The post-Civil War Amendments were essential in ending slavery and ensuring the federalization of fundamental rights. Many of the amendments were crucial in perfecting democracy by extending the franchise to blacks, to women, to the poor, and to eighteen-year-olds.
Professor Kyvig's history of the amendment process, and consid eration of the tension between constraint and change, raise two questions. Fi rst, what are the assumptions and implications of hav ing a brief constitution that is relatively difficult to change? Profes sor Kyvig's book provides a powerful reminder that this is the core nature of the U.S. Constitution. Professor Ky vig's book reveals how much such a constitution is based on trust in the government it creates and how much it relies on a judiciary with the authority to interpret and adapt the constitution to a world so vastly different from what the Framers could have imagined.
Second, when should the Constitution be amended? In the past few years, countless proposals have been introduced in Congress to amend the Constitution to achieve goals ranging from balancing the budget, to allowing school prayer, to prohibiting abortion, to out lawing flag burning. In light of Professor Ky vig's history, is it possi ble to develop a theory of when amendments are worthy? Professor Ky vig's enterprise is historical, recounting the successful and unsuccessful attempts at amendment. Professor Ky vig offers no conclusions as to when the amendment process is appropriate and when it should remain unused. Ye t his history offers an excellent vehicle for considering the proper use of the amendment process to preserve the delicate balance between entrenchment and flexibility.
This review essay uses Professor Ky vi g's careful, well-written history as the starting point for examining these two questions. Although Professor Ky vig's book is not the first recent attempt to examine the amendment process,9 it is the most systematic history to date. This excellent book should be of great interest to anyone times by voter initiative, and it is several hundred pages long.
The Charter's contrast to the U.S. Constitution could not be more striking. The Constitution is a blueprint for a government. In the words of Chief Ju stice John Marshall, "[a] constitution, to con tain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great pow ers will adinit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind."11 Marshall then uttered some of the most famous words in all of the Un ited States Reports : "In considering this question, then, we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."12 In contrast, the Los Angeles City Charter is much more an operations manual than a blueprint.
The amendment processes of the two documents are quite dif ferent. The Constitution is difficult to alter and has been amended just twenty-seven times in 220 years. The Charter is easy to revise; it takes just a maj ority vote in an election to approve a Charter amendment. The differences between the U.S. Constitution and the L.A. Charter cannot be explained by the level of government or the varying functions of the two documents. A constitution could be just as long and just as detailed as the Los Angeles Charter, and a charter could be just as brief as the U.S. Constitution. show that the style of the United States Constitution rests on two premises.
First, a short constitution that is relatively immune from change assumes great trust in those who will be governing under it. Fr e quently it is said that the Framers of the Constitution acted on a distrust of those who would be governing them in the future. Cer tainly, the Constitution's division of powers, via separation of pow ers and federalism, is based on such distrust. The strong call for a Bill of Rights, which Ky vig describes in detail (pp. 66-109), reflected a widely perceived need to further limit those who would be governing.
Yet it is striking how much detail the Fr amers left out of the Constitution, with the trust that government officials would be true to the spirit of the document. Perhaps most notably, the power of judicial review is not specified, but the Fr amers likely assumed it as implicit in a Constitution of limited powers with an Article III judi ciary.13 This is but one of countless examples of major matters that the Constitution leaves to those who would govern under it. For example, the Constitution does not mandate the funding of any of fice or agency. Nothing in the Constitution expressly requires that Congress provide money for the operation of the executive or the judiciary.14 The Constitution does not mention many basic powers of gov ernment. Although the Constitution specifies who has the appoint ment power, it is silent about removal authority.15 This is not a trivial power; it is crucial to a President's ability to control the exec utive branch, · and the issue of removal was the core of the only suc cessful effort to impeach a President. The Constitution says nothing about countless other issues that undoubtedly could have been foreseen in 1787. For example, no provision explicitly addresses who has the power to recognize foreign governments.
The lack of detail is also reflected in the broad phrasing of so many of the Constitution's provisions. Article II, for example, pro 14. There is, of course, the prohibition against decreasing judicial salaries for Article III judges. U.S. CoNST For all of these examples, and countless more, the Constitution could have been very specific. As I suggested above, what has been overlooked, and this is evident in reading Professor Ky vig's book, is the degree to which the Constitution was based on trust in those who would be governing to work out these matters and the knowl edge that there was an amendment process to solve the problems that might develop. The conventional wisdom about the Constitu tion emphasizes the Framers' distrust in government, as reflected in their desire for separation of powers, federalism, and ultimately a bill of rights. This account is undoubtedly accurate, but equally im portant is the extent to which the Constitution reflects a profound trust in those who would be governing under it.
Moreover, when the Constitution is viewed in this light, it is striking that at a time of relatively great public distrust and cynicism about government, trust remains in the basic framework set out by the Constitution. Ky vig's book does not discuss a single proposal to replace the Constitution with a modem document. Indeed, Ky vig shows that proposals for a constitutional convention for limited purposes, such as for a balanced budget amendment, are fiercely opposed based on the fear that the convention might seek to pro pose a broader overhaul in the document (pp. 440-42). The profound public trust in the Constitution is one of its most impor tant features, and the one most often taken for granted. Professor Ky vig's analysis shows how much Article V's mechanisms for amendment have been crucial to this public confidence since the Constitution's inception.
Reading Ky vig's book made clear the challenge for us in writing a new Los Angeles Charter or for anyone attempting to draft a new state constitution or city charter. A short document is possible if there is confidence in those who will hold office and confidence in the process the document allows for its change. At a time of a loss of public confidence in government at all levels, is it possible to write a blueprint rather than a legal code? Every detail in a docu ment like the Los Angeles Charter is there because a constituency wanted the protection of details. How can such groups be satisfied that their interests will be adequately safeguarded without very spe cific delineations?
A second assumption demonstrated by Ky vig's book involves the nature of the amendment process. An understanding of the Constitution as a short document that is relatively immune from change provides powerful support for the view that the Constitu tion's meaning should evolve by judicial interpretation as well as by amendment. The debate over the method of constitutional inter pretation is a familiar one. Over the last two decades, it frequently has been characterized as one between originalism, sometimes called interpretivism, and nonoriginalism, sometimes termed noninterpretivism. Originalism is the view that "j udges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution."17 In contrast, nonoriginalism is the "contrary view that courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be dis covered within the four comers of the document."1 8
Originalists It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time.
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning -"We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding. "22 Professor Ky vig's book is directly relevant to this debate be cause the ease of amendment is crucial in appraising whether change can occur only through that process. Professor Ky vig's book demonstrates that perceptions about the relative ease and dif ficulty of amendments have varied over time (pp. 188-89, 216-18, 240-41). Overall, though, Professor Ky vig's book shows a consis tent recognition that amendment was a difficult process and likely to occur only relatively infrequently.
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Therefore, to say, as originalists do, that the Constitution may be modified only by amendment is to say that there will be virtually no evolution in the meaning of the document. As noted above, though, constitutional evolution is essential for the document to deal with modem problems and to adapt to changes, such as in technology and social values. Unless the Constitution evolves, over time ever greater areas of governance will be left solely to the majoritarian processes. The Constitution's promise of constraint and entrenched protections will increasingly be lost. For example, it is highly unlikely that the Constitution could have been amended successfully to eliminate school segregation or require reapportion ment of legislatures. These examples show why it would be wrong for the Constitution to evolve solely by amendment: the rights of minorities, political or racial, should not be made to depend solely on a supermajority's willin gness to act.
Moreover, evolution solely by amendment is inferior because it is unlikely that society would be willin g to devote the energy and resources to amend the Constitution constantly. If all evolution were by amendment, frequent amendments would need to be ad ded to the Constitution. But Professor Ky vig's history shows that the cumbersome nature of the amendment process, and the need for approval from so many different institutions, makes it highly unlikely that a sufficient number of amendments would be ratified.
Even more important, frequent amendment could create problems of its own. If amendments were routine and not excep tional, there is reason to fear that precisely when it matters most, constitutional protections might be eliminated by amendment. The Framers feared that in times of crisis there would be strong pres sures to centralize power and to compromise rights. Making amendment difficult protects against those temptations. The obsta cles to successful amendments that Professor Ky vig describes are thus integral to the Constitution's central function of entrenchment.
Also, if amendments were frequent, the Constitution would lose its symbolic value as a brief, abstract document. The comparison to state constitutions and city charters is again illustrative. Joseph Long observed over 80 years ago:
The federal constitution ... has happily escaped the fate that has befallen the constitutions of the states. Not only are they subj ect to constant change, but they have long since ceased to be constitutions in a true sense. Instead of embodying broad general propositions of fun damental permanent law, they now exhibit the prolixity of a code and consist largely of mere legislation. No one now entertains any partic ular respect for a state constitution. It has little more dignity than an ordinary act of the legislature. 23
More recently, Laurence Tr ibe similarly remarked how the "clut tered" nature of state constitutions explains why they "rarely com mand the respect routinely paid to federal constitutional guarantees. "24 Thus, crucial to the very nature of the Constitution is an amend ment process, that as Professor Ky vig shows, is likely to be used successfully only relatively infrequently. The result is that essential constitutional evolution must occur by judicial interpretation and not just through the rare and occasional amendment.
II. WHEN AMEND THE CONSTITUTION?
Reading Professor Ky vig's history of the amendment process causes one to feel relief that the Fr amers made constitutional revi sions relatively difficult. He describes many efforts to amend the Constitution that thankfull y failed. For example, James Madison's first proposed amendment to the Constitution would have limited each member of the House of Representatives to representing a district of no more than 50,000 residents. If ratified, the amend ment, over time, would have led to a House that was truly unwork able. Ky vig notes: "If constituencies were limited to 50,000 citizens, the nature of republican government in a nation of 250 mil lion people would change dramatically. A representative would bear a very different relationship to 50,000 constituents than to the present average of nearly 600,000 and to 4,999 colleagues than to the current 434" (p. 470).
Most striking, as mentioned above, it defies comprehension to imagine the course of U.S. history if the amendment proposed by Congress in 1861 to institutionalize slavery had been adopted (p. 151). More recently, serious efforts to amend the Constitution to overturn the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions failed (pp. 371-79), and the assurance of one-person, one-vote is now al most universally accepted as an essential protection of the demo cratic process.2s
23. Joseph R. Long, Tin kering with the Constitution, 24 YALE L.J. 573, 580 (1915 Other beneficial constitutional amendments also never were adopted. After the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law prohibiting child labor in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 27 a serious effort was made to amend the Constitution to outlaw such practices (pp. 255-61, 307-13). The proposed amendment to forbid child labor never was ratified. The Supreme Court changed course in 1937, later expressly overruling Hammer, and thus the amendment be came unnecessary. 2 8 Yet I think it is wrong to say that the ultimate prohibition of child labor shows that the child labor amendment was unnecessary. For over twenty years, from 1918 when the Court struck down the federal child labor law until the Court permitted the regulation, countless children were hurt who might have been protected by a constitutional amendment.
Another example of a desirable amendment proposed by Con gress and not ratified by the states would have granted residents of the District of Columbia representation in Congress (pp. 394-95, 420-25). Under any theory of representative government it is im possible to justify the fact that those who live in the District of Co lumbia are not represented by voting members in the House of Representatives or the Senate. Although Congress passed an amendment to correct the problem, only sixteen states had ap proved it before the time period for its ratification expired (p. 423). The rej ection was not based on a defensible principle, but rather based on the perception that the District of Columbia's African American-majority population likely would elect Democrats to the House and the Senate.
It should not be assumed, however, that all amendments that made it through the gauntlet and were adopted were desirable changes. Ky vig provides a detailed description of how the Eight eenth Amendment, mandating prohibition of alcohol, was enacted (pp. 218-26), how quickly it came to be regarded as a colossal mis take, and how the Tw enty-first Amendment repealed it just thirteen years later (pp. 261-67).
Fo r me, the key question in reading Professor Ky vig's book is whether any lessons can be drawn from history as to when the Con stitution should be amended. In the 1990s, as Republicans gained control over both the House and the Senate, countless proposals have been introduced to amend the Constitution for matters rang ing from ensuring a balanced budget, to prohibiting flag burning, to allowing school prayer, to reforming campaign finance, to ensuring religious equality, to changing the procedures for imposing new taxes, to safeguarding victims' rights. Is it possible from a study of history, such as Ky vig's, to derive criteria as to when the Constitu tion should be amended and when left unchanged? Professor Ky vig offers no such analysis -though, in fairness, that was not his goal in the book. He sought to provide a history of the amendment pro cess and not a normative analysis of when it should be used.
Recently, others have attempted to articulate criteria for when constitutional amendment is appropriate. In August 1997, a group called Citizens for the Constitution released a draft titled, 'Great and Extraordinary Occasions': Developing Standards fo r Constitu tional Change. 29 A distinguished group that included law profes sors Michael Seidman, Kathleen Sullivan, and Don Wa llace and attorneys Alan Morrison, Robert Peck, and Peter Wallison pre pared the report. The draft report urges the need for restraint in amending the Constitution and presents criteria for when amend ment is appropriate.
Specifically, the draft report states the following principles for constitutional amendment:
1. Constitutional amendments should address matters of more than immediate concern that are likely to be recognized as of abiding im portance by subsequent generations.
29. Citizens for the Constitution, 'Great and Extraordinary Occasions': Developing Stan dards for Constitutional Change (Aug. 1997) (unpublished draft report on file with author).
2. Constitutional amendments should not make our system less po litically responsive except to the extent necessary to protect individual rights.
3. Constitutional amendments should be utilized only when there are significant practical or legal obstacles to the achievement of the same obj ectives by other means.
4.
Constitutional amendments should not be adopted when they would damage the cohesiveness of constitutional doctrine as a whole.
5. Constitutional amendments should embody enforceable, and not purely aspirational, standards.
6. Proponents of constitutional amendments should attempt to think through and articulate the consequences of their proposals, including the ways in which the amendments would interact with other constitu tional provisions and principles.
7. Constitutional amendments should be enacted using procedures designed to ensure full and fair debate.
8. Constitutional amendments should have a non-extendable dead line for ratification by the states so as to ensure that there is a contem poraneous consensus by Congress and the states that the amendment is desirable.30
It is difficult to disagree with any of these principles. Some seem unassailable. For example, who could possibly obj ect to the sixth principle, which urges reflection as to the effect of proposed amendments on other aspects of the Constitution, or the seventh principle, which calls for full and fair debate in amending the Con stitution? The first through fifth proposals likewise seem desirable and almost axiomatic.
In addition, the very recent experience with the ratification of the Tw enty-seventh Amendment shows the wisdom of the eighth proposal. Ky vig describes the story of the Tw enty-seventh Amend ment (pp. 462-70), which prohibits pay raises to members of Con gress during their terms of office, and liow it was ratified by the states and added to the Constitution nearly 200 years after it was proposed by Congress. An amendment should be deemed ratified when a supermajority of states, as prescribed in Article V, approves it. The problem when ratification occurs over decades or centuries is that there may never have been a time when a super-majority approved it, but rather different groups at varying times.
In fact, Ky vig points out that there are several other amend ments, passed by Congress and still pending before the states with out a time limit for ratification, such as "Madison's first amendment limiting the size of congressional districts to 50,000 residents, the 1810 amendment banning citizens from accepting foreign titles, the 1861 amendment guaranteeing the continuation of slavery in states 30. Id.
where it then existed, and the 1924 child labor amendment" (p. 469).
Yet, appraising these principles after reading Ky vig's history raises questions as to whether the Citizens for the Constitution's criteria are useful in distinguishing good from bad amendments. For example, I certainly agree with the first proposition that "Con stitutional amendments should address matters of more than imme diate concern that are likely to be recognized as of abiding importance by subsequent generations."31 Yet I imagine that the supporters of any amendment would defend their proposal as deal ing with matters of "abiding importance." Ky vig shows that sup porters of Prohibition, surely regarded as the largest mistake in the use of the amendment process, defended it as dealing with a signifi cant and long-term problem (pp. 218-26). Kyvig observes that "[i]n 1919 national prohibition appeared to be a widely supported inno vation in public policy and constitutionalism" (p. 225).
The Citizens for the Constitution draft report uses the proposed flag desecration amendment as an illustration of a reform that does not meet the first proposition. Although I share their opposition to the amendment, I am skeptical as to whether supporters of the pro posal would accept that conclusion. Those favoring a flag desecra tion amendment likely would argue that the flag is a unique and abiding symbol that should be protected now and forever.
More generally, I question whether it is possible at any moment in time to know which issues will be of concern only briefly and which will have lasting significance. No one could have known in 1920 whether the Supreme Court's preclusion of federal laws prohibiting child labor would have lasted for years or decades. Also, significant social problems might exist that require immediate attention by amendment, even if they tum out to be relatively short-term in duration. Again, the failed child labor amendment is illustrative. Even if it only would have had legal significance for twenty years, during that time it might have protected the health and lives of innumerable children. The Tw enty-fourth Amendment, which prohibited poll taxes, likely was not dealing with a problem of enduring significance; few states still had them when the Amend ment passed, and in those few they likely were on the way out. The Amendment, though, mattered in that it extended the franchise and symbolically reaffirmed the right of every person, regardless of wealth, to participate in the democratic process.
Perhaps more significant from a constitutional perspective is the question of ,the proper use of the amendment process as a check on the Supreme Court. Ky vig's book details four instances in which 31. Id. If it is accepted, as I argued in Part I, that the Supreme Court should have discretion in interpreting the Constitution to ensure necessary evolution, then the amendment process becomes crucial as the only direct political check on the judiciary. When is it appro priate to use the amendment process to overturn a Supreme Court decision that is regarded as seriously misguided? Although I disa gree with virtually all of the contemporary proposals to overturn Supreme Court decisions by constitutional amendments, I cannot yet articulate a reason why this is an illegitimate use of the amend ing process. To the contrary, Ky vig's history shows that since its inception the amendment process has been used in just this way. The first amendment adopted after the Bill of Rights, the Eleventh Amendment, was enacted to overturn a Supreme Court decision, and there have been countless proposals to try by amendment to overrule other decisions.
Again, I do not disagree with the effort to articulate criteria for when the Constitution should be amended. Professor Ky vig's book puts that issue directly before the reader. Nor do I disagree with the initial efforts by Citizens for the Constitution. I think, however, that Professor Kyvig's excellent history shows that developing use ful criteria will be a very difficult task. Good proposals for amend ments have been defeated and bad ones adopted; bad ones have been defeated and many good ones adopted. Supporters of all thought that they were making essential reforms; opponents of all claimed that they were protecting the maj esty of the Constitution.
Reading the descriptions of the contemporaneous debates over the proposals shows how difficult it is at any moment in time to assess how an amendment later will be regarded. Remember, even Presi dent Lincoln supported an amendment to deny Congress "the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or ser vice by the laws of said State" (p. 151).
CONCLUSION
Professor David Ky vig's book begins by quoting President George Washington's farewell address, that the Constitution "till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all" (p. 1). Washington further said: "If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way the Constitution designates" (p. 1).
Professor Kyvig's book provides an excellent history of the use of this amending process and a powerful argument that the mecha nisms created by Article V of the Constitution are at the very core of the Constitution's existence and survival. More than the Framers ever could have imagined, they created a process that provided an almost ideal balance between stability and change, between en trenchment and flexibility.
As the Elected Los Angeles Charter Reform Commission strug gles with the task of proposing a new "constitution" for Los Ange les, Professor Ky vig's book provides crucial insights. The issues for the Charter are remarkably the same as those confronted in draft ing a constitution. What branches of government should be created and how should power be allocated among them? Should power be decentralized, such as by empowering boroughs or neighborhood councils with tasks that previously had been done in a centralized fashion? Should there be an enforceable bill of rights and if so, what rights should be protected?
The central tensions identified in Professor Ky vig's book also are identical in writing a constitution or a charter. If successful in the Charter reform process, we are writing a document to last for decades and to deal with problems that we cannot begin to imagine. The document must constrain and check, but it must be adaptable too. The document must be general enough to be comprehensible and unifying, but specific enough to create a workable government. Professor Kyvig's book forces attention on how the document should be subject to change. What mechanism for revision will best strike the balance between constraint and flexibility, allowing needed reforms, but avoiding too frequent modifications?
